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NOTES
Although the Louisiana ordinance under discussion is similar
to those in the contrary cases, it is of much broader scope. It goes
further and "classifies" solicitors and peddlers by excepting those
who sell certain types of produce: namely, ice, vegetables, butter,
eggs, dairy products, and other farm produce. This classification
was held not to be class legislation and therefore not discrimina-
tory. The Court reasoned that wide discretion must be conceded
to the legislative power in the classification of trades, callings,
businesses or occupations, and that "legislation which affects alike
all persons pursuing the same business under the same conditions
is not such class legislation as is prohibited by the United States
or the State Constitution." If, however, the manner of solicita-
tion or sale is the criterion of classification, it is hard to see how
the activity of vendors of farm produce can be differentiated from
that of vendors of other products not excepted from the applica-
tion of the ordinance. On the other hand, if the classification em-
phasizes the possibility of annoyance and deceit, the distinction is
perhaps well founded. It may be that the court felt that deceit
does not characterize peddling of farm produce and that, in view
of the difficulty which city-dwellers have in obtaining fresh coun-
try products, house-to-house peddling of this class of goods may
well be considered a convenience rather than an annoyance.
R.K.
EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE-Is CONSENT OF PARENTS OR TUTOR
NECESSARY FOR A MINOR OF EIGHTEEN?-In the succession proceed-
ings of Mrs. Hecker, her surviving husband was appointed tutor
of the minor children. In lieu of the legal mortgage a special
mortgage in favor of the minors had been placed on two lots of
ground and, when the tutor desired to sell one of them, he ob-
tained permission of the court to substitute a United States Bond
for the special mortgage on that lot. The recorder of mortgages
nevertheless refused to cancel the mortgage on the ground that
since the minor (eighteen years of age) had been fully emanci-
pated by marriage the court could not authorize the substitution
of a bond. The minor asked for the cancellation of the mortgage
but the father and tutor contended that there was no emancipa-
tion by a marriage without his consent. Held, that under Article
382 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, as amended by Act 224 of
1939]
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1908, a minor eighteen years of age is emancipated by marriage
regardless of the parent's or tutor's consent. Succession of Hecker,
185 So. 32 (La. 1938).
At an early date the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that
where a minor marries without the necessary consent he is not
emancipated and that Article 379 of the Civil Code refers to mar-
riages authorized by our laws, not those in contravention of
them.' Without this restriction, irresponsible and improvident
minors could disregard their parents' wishes and enter into hur-
ried marriages in order to circumvent parental authority and gain
control of their estates.2 This rule was then followed and ap-
proved in a number of cases.3 In 1902, in the well-considered case
of Guillebert v. Grenier,4 the rule was reasserted and broadly
stated. In the preceding cases, the marriages had been solemnized
in other states and the decisions were based upon the theory that
such marriages, contracted in evasion of our laws, were contrary
to public policy. However, in the Guillebert case, the court stated
by way of dictum that, even if the marriage had been contracted
in this state, the disability regarding emancipation would be the
same."
Since Article 382 was amended by Act 224 of 1908, so as to
give the eighteen year old minor emancipated by marriage the
full rights of majority,6 there have been no cases before the Su-
preme Court in which the necessity of parental consent has been
squarely involved. On a related problem, it has been held that the
1908 act fixed a personal status and did not have a retroactive
effect but that, since it was a remedial statute, it took people in
the condition in which it found them so that a married person
who had previously reached the age of eighteen was emancipated
only upon the promulgation of the act.7 Again, since the new ar-
ticle was identical with the language of a judicial decree of eman-
cipation, it was held that prescription ran from the day of the
1. Maillefer v. Saillot, 4 La. Ann. 375 (1849).
2. Guillebert v. Grenier, 107 La. 614, 617, 32 So. 238, 239 (1902).
3. Babin v. Leblanc, 12 La. Ann. 367 (1857); Clement v. Wafer, 12 La. Ann.
599 (1857). Cf. Boydiv. Frantom, 14 La. Ann. 691 (1859), where the evidence did
not show affirmatively that the marriage was without the consent of the
tutor.
4. 107 La. 614, 32 So. 238 (1902).
5. 107 La. at 617, 32 So. at 239.
6. Succession of Bonnette, 188 La. 297, 176 So. 397 (1937); Roe v. Caldwell,
145 La. 854, 83 So. 43 (1919); Eureka Homestead Society v. Sladovich, 161 La.
265, 108 So. 478 (1926); Arrington v. Gray, 161 La. 413, 108 So. 790 (1926). See
Bostwick v. Thomson, 149 La. 152, 157, 88 So. 775, 776 (1921); Roy v. Mutual
Rice Co., 177 La. 883, 891-892, 149 So. 508, 511 (1933).
7. Bostwick v. Thomson, 149 La. 152, 88 So. 775 (1921).
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marriage.8 Of course, any minor emancipated by marriage is en-
titled to sue in his own name.9 The closest approach to the issue
of the principal case is found in a dictum that a minor would be
emancipated by a marriage without parental consent since disin-
heritance is the only penalty for this disobedience. 10
In the present case,, the decision relies heavily upon the inter-
pretation of Article 382 given in Arrington v. Gray" that, by the
1908 amendment, the legislature intended all married minors
eighteen years of age to be fully emancipated without qualifica-
tion.12 However, the Arrington case did not raise the question of
a minor's marriage without parental consent. Neither was this
question considered in the cases of Roe v. Caldwell3 and Bost-
wick v. Thomson 4 which were also cited as authority. It is there-
fore questionable whether the present decision can be justified
on the reasoning of these cases, or cases prior to 1908.15 Perhaps
it would have been more logical for the court to have adopted the
reasoning of the dissent in Guillebert v. Grenier that, since Ar-
ticle 97 (requiring parental consent to minor's marriage) is modi-
fied by Article 112 (sustaining the validity of such marriage but
making it a cause for disinheritance), the minor is emancipated
of right by the marriage. 18
In France, there is no room for such diversity of opinion be-
cause the requirement of parental consent is accompanied by the
right of the person whose necessary consent was not obtained to
have the marriage annulled. 17 Emancipation by marriage takes
place by operation of law regardless of absence of consent to the
marriage or to the emancipation, but in the event of annulment
the marriage is deemed never to have existed and the emancipa-
8. Arrington v. Gray, 161 La. 413, 108 So. 790 (1926).
9. Art. 380, La. Civil Code of 1870; Bonnette v. Flournoy, 9 La. App. 467,
119 So. 736 (1929).
10. State v. Sacred Heart Orphan Asylum, 154 La. 883, 889, 98 So. 406,
408 (1923).
11. 161 La. 413, 108 So. 790 (1926), cited in note 8, supra.
12. According to the court of appeals in the decision of the principal case,
the purpose of the amendment was not to overrule the doctrine of the GuZle-
bert case, but was merely to grant greater powers to emancipated married
minors. 180 So. 228 (La. App. 1938).
13. 145 La. 854, 83 So. 43 (1919).
14. 149 La. 152, 88 So. 775 (1921), cited supra note 7.
15. These were concerned only with the power of administration; the
question of consent was not involved. Wither's Heirs v. His Executors, 3 La.
363 (1832); Grigsby et al v. Louisiana Bank, 3 La. 491 (1832); Briscoe v.
Tarkington, 5 La. Ann. 692 (1850); Patterson & Co. v. Frazer, 8 La. Ann. 512
(1852); Succession of Mitchell, 33 La. Ann. 353 (1881).
16. Nicholls, C.J., in 32 So. 238, 239 (1902).
17. Arts. 148, 182, French Civil Code.
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tion likewise falls. 8 Thus, emancipation by marriage in France is
in effect dependent upon parental consent.
In Louisiana, since parental consent is essential for judicial
emancipation, it should also be necessary for emancipation by
marriage. The prior Louisiana jurisprudence-which is disre-
garded by the present decision-is more in harmony with other
provisions Of the Civil Code, particularly those regarding judicial
emancipation. If the refusal of a selfish parent or tutor to consent
to the minor's marriage could be considered as "ill-treatment"
within the intendment of Article 387, it would be possible to obtain
a judicial emancipation. In view of the fact that the present deci-
sion was based on the 1908 amendment of Article 382 which re-
fers only to minors who have reached the age of eighteen, it is
open to question whether the court meant to leave the rule that,
under similar circumstances, a minor under eighteen would not
be emancipated.
J.G.C.
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF PAROL TO PROVE A CONTEMPORAN-
EOUS COLLATERAL AGREEMENT-In answer to a suit for the balance
due on a written contract of sale of roofing material, defendant
contended that the plaintiff orally agreed to supervise the appli-
cation of the roofing and to guarantee the roof for ten years. The
defendant reconvened for damages resulting from faulty applica-
tion of the roofing. Held, that parol evidence may be introduced
by defendant to prove such an oral agreement, since it does not
contradict the writing and would be in the nature of a contempo-
raneous collateral agreement to do something in addition to the
obligation embodied in the written contract; but that defendant
did not discharge her burden of proving the existence of the oral
agreement. Brandin Slate Co., Inc. v. Fornea, 183 So. 572 (La.
App. 1938).
The rule precluding admission of parol evidence to add to,
subtract from, contradict or vary the terms of a valid written in-
18. 1 Planiol et Ripert, Trait6 Pratique de Droit Civil Frangais (1925)
653-654, no 618; 2 Marcad6, Explication Th6orique et Pratique du Code Napo-
leon (5 ed. 1852) 267, no 476; 5 Laurent, Principes de Droit Civil Frangais (2
ed. 1876) 216-217, no 195; 8bis Beudant, Cours de Droit Civil Frangais (2 ed.
1936) 301, no 1716; 1 Aubry et Rau, Cours de Droit Civil Frangais (5 ed. 1897)
831-832, § 129; 3 Huc, Commentaire Th~orique et Pratique du Code Civil
(1892) 448, no 466. See Art. 476, French Civil Code.
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